Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds by Häseler, Sönke
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Individual Enforcement Rights in
International Sovereign Bonds
So¨nke Ha¨seler
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics
10. November 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11518/
MPRA Paper No. 11518, posted 12. November 2008 08:58 UTC
 1 







Sovereign bonds are notoriously hard to enforce. What little rights bondholders have can be 
vested either collectively or individually. It seems that investors, particularly in the US market, 
traditionally had a preference for the latter, which hindered financial market reform projects, such 
as the universal adoption of collective action clauses in 2003.  
This paper uses a range of theoretical approaches to discuss whether it is indeed in the 
bondholder’s collective interest to be allowed to individually sue and attach the debtor country’s 
assets following a default. Furthermore, it examines the landmark case of Elliott Associates v. 
Peru to attempt a quantitative assessment of just how much sovereign bondholders actually value 
individual enforcement rights. I find that even the single most important event to reinforce 
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1 - Introduction 
Research question 
This paper is concerned with the question of whether extensive individual enforcement rights 
necessarily benefit the holders of international sovereign bonds in a situation of default. At a 
superficial level, it is not obvious how more rights could possibly hurt creditors. Michael 
Chamberlin (2002a, p. 4), Executive Director of the Trade Association for the Emerging Markets 
(EMTA) and as such a chief lobbyist for bondholder rights, argues accordingly:  
Contracts, even sovereign debts, should be enforceable. There is a growing 
perception in the bondholder community that they are not, and that creditor rights 
should be strengthened, not weakened. At a bare minimum, rather than overriding 
the rights of individual bondholders, greater attention should be given to seeking 
ways to ensure that bondholders are constructively included in the restructuring 
process. 
From a slightly more analytical perspective, the virtues of individual enforcement rights are less 
evident. Three reasons for this are analysed here. First, enforcement action against a sovereign 
debtor is impractical for most retail investors due to economies of scale in legal action and the 
international nature of the contractual relationship. Second, because of the well-known collective 
action problems among creditors, a group of bondholders whose members have individual 
enforcement rights may actually be worse off than with collective rights only. Third, depending 
on which view one takes of sovereign default, the threat of enforcement as a deterrent against 
repudiation may not work, so that one of the most important arguments for individual 
enforcement breaks down.  
Thus theory is ambiguous about the merits of individual enforcement rights. Empirical 
evidence, on the other hand, is scarce, at least with respect to sovereign bonds. I examine 
bondholders’ reactions to the famous (or infamous, depending on the perspective) case of Elliott 
Associates versus the Republic of Peru to add some empirical insights to the debate on creditor 
rights. A time-series analysis of bond price movements surrounding the settlement date does not 
support the view that individual enforcement rights, which were arguably strengthened by the 
case, are a major concern to investors. 
Motivation 
Sovereign bonds are peculiar instruments. A state whose government does not repay its debts 
cannot be liquidated, and bondholders have only limited recourse to legal remedies. What 
bondholders can and cannot do to recover their claims has therefore always been an issue of 
uncertainty and tension, probably more so than in corporate debt markets. This tension shaped the 
discussions that eventually led to the most important recent change to the international financial 
architecture, namely the almost universal adoption of collective action clauses in new sovereign 
bond issues beginning in 2003.1  
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 Bradley et al (2008) provide detailed figures on the prevalence of CACs in the US market: In 2003, 70% 
of new issues contained CACs. In the period 2004 to 2007, the share increased to 92%. 
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Spurred by the Mexican Tequila crisis in 1994, the Group of Ten countries had set up a working 
party to develop strategies for the more timely and orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises. 
The resulting Rey Report called for a set of provisions to be introduced into sovereign bond 
contracts that would later be called collective action clauses. Theses clauses had already been a 
regular feature of bonds issued under the laws of England for many decades but were generally 
not used for bonds in the other major jurisdiction, New York State. Besides provisions for the 
improved flow of information, engagement of the debtor and convening of bondholder meetings, 
collective action clauses most importantly comprise two sets of clauses: First, majority 
restructuring (or amendment) provisions allow a qualified majority of bondholders, typically 
75%, to amend the payment terms of the bond and to make the amendment binding on all 
bondholders of that particular issue. Thus, an agreement on debt relief is more easily concluded 
between the debtor and the required majority of creditors, and dissenting bondholders are 
prevented from disrupting the restructuring by holding out and bringing legal action against the 
sovereign after a restructuring agreement has been reached. Second, majority enforcement 
provisions, although already commonplace in the US market, were to be amended so as to bar 
lawsuits from individual investors following a default but before the restructuring, which was to 
be achieved amongst other means by requiring any proceeds from litigation to be shared between 
all bondholders. 
Clearly, the planned introduction of collective action clauses in the US market implied a 
significant curtailing of bondholders’ individual enforcement rights - a necessary sacrifice on the 
way to more efficient sovereign debt markets. It was therefore inevitable that emerging markets 
investors would resist the initiative - or was it? I will return to this question throughout the paper.  
The Rey Report marked the beginning of a steady stream of publications and speeches by 
both academics and representatives of international financial institutions who praised collective 
action clauses and tried to disperse the market’s fears of impaired creditor rights and, 
consequently, higher spreads. None of the rhetoric showed any effect until finally in March 2003 
Mexico made the first publicly placed bond issue with collective action clauses under New York 
law and thereby initiated a complete reversal of market practice in the US market. Almost all new 
issues since then have made use of such clauses.  
There has been some speculation as to the reasons for the seven-year delay between the 
earliest calls for the wider use of collective action clauses and the first sign of action. Gelpern and 
Gulati (2007) discuss this question in great depth. Undeniably, the scepticism of some 
bondholders towards a perceived loss of legal rights, as exemplified by the above quote, 
contributed to the time lag in financial innovation. Part of the motivation for the present empirical 
investigation therefore is to examine whether that scepticism was justified - in a sense, a purely 
historical interest. 
This paper is, however, also motivated by the fact that financial innovation is not yet 
complete. While collective action clauses are now ubiquitous in bonds that are issued under New 
York law, issuers in the German market failed to follow the development. Bonds governed by 
German law traditionally required unanimous consent for a change in the payments terms. When 
the pressure to adopt collective action clauses rose, it may have been uncertainty about the 
legality of majority voting that perpetuated the status quo (Liu, 2002). It seems that public 
statements by the German federal government about the admissibility of collective action clauses 
(BMF, 2000) did not fully dispel the doubts of sovereign issuers. The German Central Bank, 
fearing that missing out on the important developments would hurt the standing of the German 
financial market, urged the legislator to amend the relevant laws (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003). 
The government subsequently reversed its position inasmuch as Finance Minister Hans Eichel 
said at the 2004 IMF Spring Meeting that a reform of the indenture law was underway (Eichel, 
2004), even though new legislation had been considered unnecessary earlier. Four years later, a 
draft of the new Schuldverschreibungsgesetz (indenture law) has finally been completed. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the improved legal certainty can actually induce issuers to 
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face the risk of negative investor reaction to bonds with weaker individual and stronger collective 
rights.  
Lastly, in both the German and the US markets there has still been no change with respect 
to the administrative structures of sovereign bonds. Many academics and policymakers have 
called for the increased use of trust structures, which are more conducive to collective action - 
and hence potentially offensive to bondholders worried about individual enforcement rights - than 
the more traditional fiscal agency arrangements.  
Both of these two pending reforms could, when implemented, meet the resistance of 
investors - or policymakers may be afraid that they could. In either case, a better understanding of 
bondholders’ views about their enforcement rights would be desirable.  
Related literature and structure of the paper 
Besides the vast literature on sovereign debt in general, this paper expands on the discussion of 
bondholders’ attitudes towards individual enforcement rights in Häseler (2007). Fisch and Gentile 
(2004, p. 1106) suggest “measuring the extent to which investors value the litigation option” via 
yield differences between bonds with different sets of creditor rights. Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2006) propose to use insights about the effectiveness of the litigation threat for the 
construction of sovereign debt pricing models. In a sense, this is the reverse of the approach taken 
here. Thus, an interest to get a quantitative handle on the value of litigation against sovereign 
debtors exists in the literature but empirical evidence is so far sparse. Alfaro et al (2007) are 
currently engaged in panel data research on the effect of holdout litigation on bond spreads. Their 
methodology is similar to the one used in this paper but the focus of interpretation differs. 
Bradley et al (2008) similarly examine the effect of the Elliott case on bond yields, but for a 
longer time horizon. Also, their analysis focuses on holdout risk, rather than on enforcement 
rights – although it could be said that these are in fact two sides of the same coin.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some historical and 
factual background to the current state of individual bondholder rights. Section 3 discusses some 
of the theoretical approaches to assessing the value of those rights. Section 4 provides the facts of, 
and reactions to, the Elliott case and derives some testable hypothesis. In section 5, the data and 
methodology are presented and the regression results are discussed. Section 6 concludes. 
2 - Some Background 
Following a brief history of sovereign debt enforcement, this section presents the current state of 
individual enforcement rights, describing the difference that the adoption of collective action 
clauses has made and the difference that the wider use of trust structures, if implemented, could 
make. 
Historical Perspective: Gunboats… 
The ability of bondholders to take defaulting sovereigns to court is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. When especially Latin American countries began to finance their growth 
increasingly through the bond markets in the 19th century, they were protected from lawsuits by 
the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, which posited that no government could be sued in a 
foreign court without its consent. In that era, aggrieved creditors’ options were restricted to 
bundling their voices in institutions such as the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, and 
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trying to persuade their national governments to apply political pressure on the debtor country. 
Common wisdom has it that such pressure regularly took the form of military action, as in the 
famous case of the joint British, German and Italian blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902.  
Tomz (2006) cites support for this ‘gunboat hypothesis’ from major authorities such as 
Rudiger Dornbusch and the Economist magazine. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005) find that 
between 1870 and 1913, the exertion of military pressure or political control over a debtor 
country was a common and successful enforcement strategy. Likewise, Tomz finds a positive and 
significant correlation between defaults and militarised disputes but goes on to look at the deeper 
causes of the hostilities. Examining historical political documents, he finds no indication that 
gunboat diplomacy was ever motivated by the desire to satisfy domestic creditors’ claims but 
rather by other grievances, often involving harm done to the creditor country’s assets or citizens 
in the course of unrest in the debtor country.  
According to Tomz, the statistical association between gunboat incidents and default 
periods is therefore spurious. The author does not attempt to explain this result, even though at 
least one potential cause of the correlation seems quite obvious. A civil war or similar condition 
in the debtor country is likely to cause two things: first, a deterioration of the country’s ability to 
repay its debts and hence a higher default risk, and second, adverse effects on the property and 
citizens of other countries, which in turn may seek compensation through the use of military 
force. So it is quite natural that defaults and militarised disputes will tend to co-occur. A better 
test would be to compare two countries’ probabilities of sending gunboats, where both countries 
have been affected by the civil war in the debtor country, but only one of them has an interest in 
debt collection.  
One might think that the era of enforcement by gunboats, if indeed it can be labelled as 
such, formally ended in 1907 with the signing of the Hague Convention on “The Limitation of 
Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts”. Alfaro et al (2007) would disagree, for 
they examine a number of militarised interventions by the United States in Central American 
countries in the period 1905 to 1929, all of which were intended to protect the interests of US 
bondholders or to pre-empt similarly motivated interventions by European states. But be that as it 
may, the Great Depression finally put an end to US involvement in debt collection, so with 
gunboats gone for good and sovereign immunity still firmly in place, the time that followed 
arguably saw the position of bondholders at its weakest.  
The ability of the sovereign bond market to survive in a setting in which an opportunistic 
defaulter had to fear only loss of reputation was tested when, due to the Depression, all but three 
Latin American countries fell behind on their debt service. Bondholder committees were formed 
to negotiate with the debtor countries but the debtors lacked incentives to reach an agreement in a 
timely fashion and the committees lacked the power to bind all bondholders when an agreement 
was reached. Thus, as a result of insufficient enforcement mechanisms, the sovereign bond 
market dried up and private finance was replaced by lending from other governments and 
international institutions, in particular development banks (Fish and Gentile, 2004).  
…and Courts 
Two developments then brought bondholders back into play. The first was yet another shift in the 
composition of lending to developing countries. The oil price shocks of the 1970s sent large sums 
flowing from the oil exporting countries to commercial banks and then on to Latin American 
countries that needed to finance their increased expenditures on oil. A number of those countries 
subsequently defaulted in the following decade. The defaults were cured through what became 
known as the Brady Plan of 1989: The debtor countries were granted substantial reductions in the 
face value of the debt, and the banks were able to sell on the syndicated loans to the market in the 
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form of Brady bonds. As a result, by the late 1990s there was once again an active market for 
Latin American bond debt.  
Secondly, the position of bondholders was strengthened by important changes in the legal 
environment. The doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity was abandoned in all major 
jurisdictions between the 1950s and the 1970s. As states and state-owned entities had increasingly 
engaged in international commercial transactions, immunity gave them an unfair advantage over 
private sector competitors and was therefore restricted wherever states or their agents acted as 
commercial players (Alfaro et al, 2007).2 The relevant legal documents include the Tate Letter by 
the US State Department (1952), the European Convention on State Immunity (1972), the US 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA, 1976), and the British State Immunity Act (1978). So 
when the 1980s heralded the next wave of defaults in Latin America, sovereign debtors were for 
the first time vulnerable to suits from creditors.  
It was not long before the first creditors began to explore the newly-opened avenues of debt 
enforcement. Arising out of the Costa Rican default in 1981, Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional 
de Costa Rica was the first notable example of creditor litigation.3 Banco Nacional initially 
sought defence in sovereign immunity, but the New York court found that immunity had been 
explicitly waived in the loan contract. Furthermore, the act of state doctrine, which says that the 
courts of one country must not judge on the sovereign acts of another, was raised for defence but 
to no avail. This first case, although nominally successful, already demonstrated quite clearly the 
limited value of the litigation remedy. The syndicate of banks surrounding Libra had claims 
against Banco Nacional amounting to $35 million, however, only $2.5 million worth of assets 
could be located within the jurisdiction of the New York court, and the sum that the plaintiffs 
were eventually able to attach was lower still at $800,000 (Fisch and Gentile, 2004).  
In 1985, the court once more ruled against Costa Rica in Allied Bank International v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago. Besides the act of state doctrine, another popular defence 
was rejected, namely comity, a rather vague concept which US courts have tended to interpret to 
mean that another state’s actions are admissible if they are in accordance with US policy. The 
Allied case has been identified as the first instance of holdout litigation because at least the later 
stages of the dispute arose from the unwillingness of Allied’s client, Fidelity Union, to agree to 
the terms of a restructuring that had already been accepted by all other banks in the syndicate. 
Yet, despite the success in court, Allied eventually settled for the same terms as the other banks 
and so the holdout strategy did not pay off.  
Sovereign immunity lost the last of its sway in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover (1992). 
The case established, in line with earlier judgements, that issuing bonds is a commercial activity 
in the sense of the FSIA, and the fact that interest payments are made in New York entails that the 
United States are directly affected so that US courts can exercise unconstrained jurisdiction. A 
fourth common defence was denied in CIBC Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central 
do Brazil. Banco Central invoked the law of champerty, which bars litigation based on claims that 
were purchased with the intent of bringing lawsuit. Once again the court sided with the plaintiff.  
The position of creditors was further strengthened in Pravin Bankers v. Banco Popular del 
Peru and Elliott Associates v. Republic of Panama (both 1997), where the courts ruled that claims 
based on debt that was purchased a deep discounts on the secondary market are valid and 
enforceable. With this history of largely successful – but not always fruitful - creditor litigation 
against defaulting sovereign borrowers in mind, next I discuss the impact of recent and possible 
future bond market reforms on individual creditor rights.  
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 Another interesting justification is that “the U.S. felt uneasy with granting sovereign immunity to Soviet 
Union state owned companies operating in the U.S.” (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006b, p. 37) 
3
 More detailed accounts of these important cases are to be found in Fisch and Gentile (2004) and 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a), amongst others. 
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Individual Enforcement Rights 
With sovereign immunity out of the way and most of the debtor countries’ defences cleared, 
bondholders during the 1990s enjoyed extensive liberties to pursue their claims in court 
independently of other bondholders. I will refer to these liberties as individual enforcement rights 
and will first focus on the conditions for individual enforcement pertaining to bonds governed by 
the laws of New York before the introduction of collective action clauses in 2003. The relevant 
clauses in the bond contracts go under the common heading of majority enforcement provisions 
and regulate the initiation of proceedings, acceleration of the principal, and reversal of 
acceleration.  
The right to initiate legal proceedings against the debtor country rests with individual 
bondholders if the bond was issued under a fiscal agency agreement, which is still the most 
widely used administrative structure in the US market. The fiscal agent serves exclusively the 
debtor, and its duties are primarily restricted to making payments of interest and principal to the 
bondholders.  
Furthermore, to make litigation against a defaulting debtor worthwhile, creditors must have 
the right, upon an event of default, to sue not just for any missed interest payments, but also to 
accelerate the loan, i.e. to declare the entire outstanding balance payable immediately. 
Acceleration usually requires a vote by at least 25% of the bondholders of a particular issue, but 
some bonds afford the owners the right to accelerate their claims individually. A majority vote of 
50% or more of bondholders can often rescind a prior acceleration. Acceleration played a pivotal 
role in the CIBC Bank case,4 whereas reversal of acceleration was crucial to Ecuador’s 
restructuring in 2000 (Buchheit et al, 2001). 
Vultures 
The combination of extensive individual enforcement rights in at least some bond contracts, the 
demise of sovereign immunity, and the dismissal of the debtors’ most popular defences has 
resulted in creditor lawsuits “in the hundreds”5 since the 1980s. Some creditors have become 
known as ‘vulture funds’, or, more neutrally, ‘distressed debt funds’ for their aggressive litigation 
strategies. These are investment companies that specialise in buying the debt of financially 
troubled countries in the secondary market and suing for full repayment when at the same time 
most other creditors are prepared to grant debt relief in a restructuring.  
While obtaining a favourable judgement has been comparatively and increasingly easy, the 
effectiveness of the legal remedy is limited by the availability of assets that belong to the debtor, 
that are situated within the relevant jurisdiction (usually New York State) and can be attached to 
satisfy the claim. Diplomatic assets, for example, are still covered by sovereign immunity (White, 
2005). “In practice, creditors have little difficulty in securing court judgements ordering the 
sovereign to repay after a default.”6 However, “[g]oing to court in a G-7 (or similar) country is 
beneficial only if the lender identifies property of the defaulting sovereign in that jurisdiction (or 
another jurisdiction willing to levy execution on the first jurisdiction’s judgement). And 
defaulting sovereigns try their best not to leave valuables lying around.”7 Sandoval (2002, p. 4) 
writes that the “traditional problem of suing a sovereign” is the “practical impossibility of 
attaching the sovereign’s assets in order to obtain payment.” Yet, there have been some 
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 Fisch and Gentile (2004). However, the claims in that case were based on bank loans, rather than bonds.  
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 Bratton and Gulati (2003, p. 11) 
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spectacular cases of successful vulturing, often thanks to the creditors’ inventive strategies for 
locating attachable payment streams in the relevant jurisdiction. Examples include privatisation 
revenues, VAT revenues, or aircraft landing fees. Rather than the prospect of losing the actual 
asset, what often forces the debtors to give in are the imminent follow-up costs that would arise 
from the ‘virtual blockade’ on fresh money imposed by the vultures (Alfaro et al, 2007). In some 
cases, the mere threat of a lawsuit and the nuisance it entails may suffice to induce the debtor to 
settle. 
Collective Action Clauses 
To limit the disruptive activities of vulture funds was one of the main motivation behind the 
efforts to introduce collective action clauses into the US market. The clauses that have been 
implemented since 2003 have effected some restrictions of individual enforcement rights but are 
insufficient to eliminate vulturing altogether.  
As mentioned in the introduction, majority action provisions have been a feature of nearly 
all newly-issued sovereign bonds under New York governing law since February 2003. In most 
cases, the required voting threshold for changing payment terms is set at 75% of outstanding 
bonds (Drage and Hovaguimian, 2004). A debtor’s restructuring proposal that is accepted by the 
necessary majority becomes binding for all bondholders under the same contract. The simple but 
important implication is that dissenting creditors have no basis for litigation as long as the debtor 
honours the new contract terms. Thus, collective action clauses effectively prevent holdout 
litigation, that is, litigation after the restructuring has been concluded - the preferred strategy of 
vulture funds. Several of the cases cited above would have had no basis if collective action 
clauses had been a feature of (bank) loan contacts earlier on.  
Trust structures 
What remains largely intact, however, is the scope for litigation after default but before a 
restructuring becomes effective. In a period that may last years, for example if the borrowing 
country hesitates to approach creditors to engage in negotiations or when a restructuring offer 
fails to meet the required approval, sovereign debtors under New York law are still vulnerable to 
creditor suits despite collective action clauses. The likelihood of such litigation has been reduced 
only somewhat because collective acceleration (by at least 25% of bondholders) has now become 
the standard.  
When the US market finally embraced collective action clauses, it at the same time rejected 
more decisive steps towards collective enforcement. Policy institutions and academics had been 
calling since the late 1990s for reforms that would bar lawsuits even before the restructuring and 
thus prevent a race to the courthouse. The G10 Working Group, amongst others, suggested that 
new bond issues under New York law should follow the English practice of appointing a trustee 
to represent the bondholders, rather than for the bond to be issued under a fiscal agency 
agreement. The establishment of a trust deed is a requirement for listing on the London Stock 
Exchange. The trustee has the sole power to sue the debtor on behalf of the bondholders if 
instructed to do so, typically by a vote of 25% of bondholders. Any proceeds from litigation are 
then distributed among the creditors on a pro rata basis. Thus, trust structures constitute a double 
defence against vultures: Individual legal action is not possible (unless the vulture holds more 
than 25% of the debt) and, even if it was, the sharing rule would make it utterly unprofitable.  
In contrast to the success of collective action clauses, the years of advocacy for trust 
structures showed no effect as issuers chose to leave individual enforcement rights untouched in 
this respect. The vast majority of newly issued bonds in New York since 2003 continue to be 
governed by fiscal agency agreements, which means that bondholders still have the individual 
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right to bring action against the debtor, have no obligation to share the proceeds, and in some 
cases may even accelerate the bonds individually. Of the seventeen bonds issued in the first 18 
months since the adoption of collective action clauses, only two had made use of a trust 
indenture, the American variant of the English trust deed (Drage and Hovaguimian, 2004). 
Indeed, the adherence to established structures appears to have been a deliberate choice by 
market participants. “Of all the proposals to change sovereign bond documentation, the investor 
community reserved its special wrath for the sharing clause idea. Trade associations representing 
bond market investors were uniform in their rejection of the proposal to add sharing clauses to 
sovereign bonds.”8 The Emerging Markets Creditors Association and the Trade Associations for 
the Emerging Markets actively opposed any sharing mechanism that “unduly restricts the right of 
individual bondholder action.”9 
To reiterate, whereas new bonds with collective action clauses are no longer prone to 
holdout litigation after a restructuring, the recent change in market practice has made little 
difference to the enforcement rights of bondholders who wish to pursue their claims individually 
while others are negotiating with the debtor country.  
Given this brief account of the current state of individual enforcement rights, in the next 
section I will draw on some theoretical considerations before moving on to an empirical 
assessment of the merits of such rights.  
3 - Some Theory 
This section deals with some of the theory that can be brought to bear on the question as to 
whether bondholders as a class of creditors might prefer individual or collective enforcement 
rights. Focusing on the interest of bondholders, it disregards wider welfare considerations, which 
are touched upon for example in various publications of the IMF, as well as in Häseler (2007).  
It is difficult to approach the question systematically because of the multitude of views and 
theoretical concepts, most of which are related, though it is not always clear in what manner. I 
will proceed by discussing in turn three motives for bondholders to pursue individual legal action 
against the debtor.10  
Disciplining the debtor 
Why do sovereign debtors default? 
It is a widely held view that without effective enforcement powers for (individual) bondholders, 
sovereign debt would be prone to opportunistic default and sovereign debt markets could 
therefore not exist in their present form. Either outcome would be clearly undesirable for 
creditors, if not for all parties concerned.  
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 An alternative approach would be to discuss both benefits and costs of individual enforcement rights. 
However, the costs do not make for particularly interesting analysis. As explained in virtually every 
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Creditor representatives have justified their demand for stronger individual enforcement rights 
with the concern about repudiation and the future viability of sovereign debt markets. Chamberlin 
(2002b) warned that any infringement of the “legitimate right of creditors to enforce their claims” 
could “further reduce the flow of private capital to the Emerging Markets”. 
Academics, too, have emphasised the role of creditor litigation in disciplining sovereign 
borrowers. Fisch and Gentile (2004, p. 1051) particularly stress the value of holdout litigation: 
“[B]y reducing the likelihood of opportunistic defaults, holdout creditors increase capital flows to 
sovereign debtors… The extent to which holdout creditors provide those values… depends upon 
the power conferred through judicial enforcement of their claims against sovereign debtors.” The 
authors also cite opinions of the US Justice Department and the New York Clearing House 
Association which “suggest a clear relationship between the availability of judicial enforcement 
of loan agreements against defaulting sovereigns and the functioning of the sovereign debt 
market” (p. 1085). 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a) hold that stronger enforcement rights could improve 
the welfare of both borrowers and lenders, given that, as can be argued, the amount of lending is 
currently sub-optimal and the cost of borrowing is excessive compared to a world in which 
sovereigns cannot repudiate their debts. Alfaro et al (2007) agree that stronger enforcement could 
reduce the cost of capital for developing countries, which in itself does not benefit the lenders, but 
which implies more lending and hence greater gains from trade for both sides. In the same vein, 
Hallak (2003) finds that more borrowing takes place under laws that provide stronger creditor 
protection.  
What underlies all of these statements about the merits of debt enforcement is the 
assumption that the threat of litigation directly affects borrower behaviour. But does it? This may 
be quite a bold assumption to make in light of the host of conflicting theories about the factors 
that cause a sovereign borrower to default. Figure 1 below brings the most important views of 
sovereign default into a rough order.  
 
 
willingness to pay ability to pay 
default depends on… 
reputation direct costs 
Figure 1: Different views of sovereign default 
trade santions / damage to financial sector / etc. costs of legal enforcement 
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The simplest and most fundamental assumption which the proponents of individual enforcement 
implicitly base their demands on is that borrowers actually have a choice between servicing and 
not servicing their debts. The question is whether debt service (or lack thereof) is determined 
primarily by a country’s ability to pay, in which case we might speak of distress defaults and – of 
course – there is no room for considerations of deterrence, or by its willingness to pay, in which 
case defaults may be considered as strategic or opportunistic.  
A report by the Inter-American Development Bank (2006) argues that defaults tend to 
occur after or amid pronounced economic downturns and that debtor countries often undertake 
great efforts to avoid default even against all odds: “There is little evidence… of strategic 
sovereign defaults ever occurring” (p. 236). Bratton and Gulati (2003, p. 17) confirm that 
“sovereigns as a practical matter only default under identifiably bad conditions”, indicating that 
sheer inability to pay is a crucial reason for default.  
Yet, it must be admitted that a government almost always has the option to cut 
expenditures or to increase revenues even at short notice, so that at the limit, a country’s ability to 
repay can in fact be equated to its willingness to accept political costs. Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2006b) provide a reconciliation of the two views: Assuming that a government is 
willing to bear only a certain level of political costs in order to continue with debt service, a 
deterioration in the country’s ability to repay, for example caused by a sudden drain of reserves or 
a decline in tax revenues, will push the costs of debt service above the accepted level and thus 
trigger default. Appealing as this synthesis may be, it does not provide an answer to the question 
as to which view best describes debtor behaviour – most likely because no definite answer exists. 
Bratton and Gulati (2003) add that considerations of both types are present in all decisions to 
default and that it is impossible to tell from an outside perspective whether a default episode 
should be attributed to the distress or opportunistic category.  
Most of the literature on sovereign default has focused on the “willingness to pay” view - 
not surprisingly because the alternative view does not provide much scope for analysis. 
According to this perspective, a debtor who can decide freely whether or not to honour his 
obligations will conduct a cost-benefit-analysis of default. Much has been written about the 
elusive costs of default. The first theoretical investigation into the question as to why sovereigns 
repay was the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) Their model of sovereign borrowing 
shows that under certain conditions, debt repayment is sustainable even if default entails no costs 
other than loss of reputation and the resulting exclusion from future borrowing. Exclusion from 
capital markets is in itself costly because countries are assumed to borrow and lend in order to 
smooth consumption across business cycles.  
The model by Eaton and Gersovitz has been criticised from several angles.11 First, the 
threat of permanent exclusion from borrowing, which the model’s lending equilibrium depends 
on, is not credible because both parties could benefit if lending was resumed at a later stage. In 
other words, the equilibrium is not ‘renegotiation-proof’. Second, lending in international capital 
markets may not be the only way in which countries can dampen income shocks. If other means, 
such as insurance, are available, the threat of a lending embargo of course loses some of its force. 
A third attack on Eaton and Gersovitz arises from empirical research which shows that the 
interest penalty that a defaulter will suffer is so small and short-lived that repudiation may 
actually pay off.12 Costs of reputation, then, apparently do not suffice to explain why sovereigns 
repay.  
The subsequent literature has therefore focused on other, more direct costs of default. A 
prominent theory, which is supported by at least some evidence, is that a defaulting country will 
lose international trade, either due to explicit embargoes imposed by creditor countries or because 
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firms in the defaulting country experience difficulties obtaining trade credit. Defaults have also 
been shown to negatively affect the domestic financial sector. If domestic banks invest heavily in 
government debt, the default will have a devastating impact on their balance sheets, causing the 
banks to restrict their lending to the private sector with the usual consequences for economic 
growth. The probability that a banking crisis will follow within two years after a default has been 
estimated at 14%.13 Furthermore, a default will also likely carry political costs besides the loss of 
reputation with creditors. 
With the increased threat of creditor litigation in recent years, the list of direct costs of 
default must be extended to include costs arising from debt enforcement (“legal costs”). At least 
three sources of costs can be identified. First, the debtor will have to incur legal expenses for the 
defence against the creditor suit. Second, the country may be forced to devote substantial efforts 
to the avoidance of attachment, e.g. it may have to redirect its payment flows outside the reach of 
creditors. Third, and most importantly, the country may lose its access to fresh financing, not just 
due to the loss of reputation but because of the immediate threat that creditors could attach any 
revenues from new bond issues (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006a). For instance in the Elliott 
case discussed below, creditor litigation made it impossible for Peru to meets its obligations to 
other bondholders, causing Moody’s to downgrade its credit rating for the country.  
This last category of costs brings us back to the starting point of this section: Only if 
sovereign defaults are viewed as strategic rather than inevitable, only if the costs of default are at 
least partly of a direct nature rather than consisting purely in reputation costs, and only if those 
direct costs consist at least in part in the costs of legal sanctions, only then can stronger individual 
enforcement rights possibly serve to discipline sovereign debtors.  
Individual versus collective enforcement 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that enforcement rights indeed have a deterrence effect, it 
may be asked if those rights necessarily have to be vested individually, rather than collectively, to 
achieve that effect. When a country considers repudiating its debts, does it make a difference for 
its government to know whether a potential lawsuit will be lodged by an individual bondholder or 
by a representative, such as a trustee? Granted, the threshold for initiating proceedings seems 
higher in the case in which at least 25% of bondholders have to instruct the trustee to sue. Yet, in 
most of the episodes in which a single creditor is able and willing to sue, it is probably possible to 
mobilise 25% of bondholders to do the same, which means that the deterrence effect is also the 
same, if not greater.  
In fact, collective litigation may actually be more readily forthcoming than individual suits. 
The conventional story in the economic analysis of bankruptcy law is that individual enforcement 
rights provide creditors with an incentive to sue which is excessive from a collective perspective. 
However, the opposite may actually hold for two reasons. First, litigation involves fixed costs and 
hence returns to scale. Second, the costs are private (they accrue only to the litigant) whereas the 
expected gains involve some positive externalities to the other bondholders. So if no mechanism 
for collective action exists, we may actually see each creditor waiting for the others to move first, 
i.e., the incentives to bring individual suit are suboptimal, rather than excessive.  
In that type of situation, a trust structure may be able to bring forward a lawsuit where 
exclusively individual enforcement rights could not. Collective action helps spread the fixed costs 
and internalises the externalities. The threat to a potential repudiator may thus be greater than 
with individual enforcement rights.  
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Adjusting yields 
Even if - in spite of all the reservations mentioned above - greater enforcement capabilities reduce 
the ex ante probability of default, and even if individual rather than collective rights are strictly 
necessary, it remains to be explained why a lower default probability would in fact be to the 
advantage of creditors. The question arises from the ‘adjusting yields’ argument that was already 
made in Häseler (2007). Assuming that bond yields adjust to fully reflect the different default 
probabilities of bonds with collective and individual enforcement rights, then bondholders are 
perfectly compensated for the difference in risk. If, however, for some reason they really wanted 
to avoid the additional risk, they can always recreate the “safer” type of bond (supposedly those 
with individual enforcement rights) by holding the riskier type and making a risk-less loan. Either 
way, bondholders should be indifferent about the deterrence effect of enforcement. 
To sum up, ex ante justifications for stronger individual enforcement rights do not appear 
to stand up to even some superficial theoretical scrutiny.  
Eliciting a (better) restructuring offer 
Further justifications for stronger individual enforcement rights can be derived from the ex post 
situation, i.e. after the debtor has declared a moratorium or has actually defaulted. 
Once a debtor country has made the difficult decision to default and has accepted the 
inevitable loss of reputation, there may be no compelling reason for it to approach its creditors to 
negotiate a restructuring deal, so long as the country has no immediate need for additional capital 
from the financial markets. The IMF’s ‘lending into arrears’ policy requires the debtor to 
negotiate with the creditors in good faith, but again this requirement is not compelling for 
countries that do not depend on IMF loans. One of the main objectives of the Group of Ten model 
collective action clauses was “to foster early dialogue, coordination, and communication among 
creditors and a sovereign caught up in a sovereign debt problem”; however, engagement 
provisions, which could have brought the promise of timely consultations with the debtor, were 
generally not adopted. So in some situations, the threat of litigation can be only device that 
bondholders have at their disposal to force the debtor country to the negotiating table. All the 
costly consequences of creditor suits that were mentioned in the context of deterrence come into 
play again in the ex post perspective – if nothing else, the prospect of legal battles with hundreds 
of bondholders should persuade the defaulting country that it is in its own interest to make a 
restructuring offer. Miller and Thomas (2006) stress the function of litigation for engaging the 
debtor in the case of the Argentine default. According to their interpretation, the court used the 
threat of granting attachment orders to ensure that the defaulting country negotiated in good faith 
with creditors.  
Besides the timing, the quality of the restructuring offer itself can also be seen in relation to 
enforcement rights. “Litigation may also operate as a check on the terms of the proposed 
restructuring, giving creditors recourse against a restructuring that provides insufficient 
value…”14 Clearly, the better the exchange offer, the less likely it is that the debtor will have to 
bear to nuisance of creditor suits. A lower threshold for (individual) litigation thus translates into 
greater bargaining power for creditors. Accordingly, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a, p. 3) 
hypothesise that “the threat of litigation may be an obvious candidate to explain the large 
recovery values obtained by creditors in some recent debt restructurings…” 
Similarly to the first motive discussed above, if the objective is to receive a better and 
timelier restructuring offer, stronger individual enforcement rights appear to be in line with the 
collective interest of bondholders. Again one may ask if the same goal could not be achieved with 
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collective enforcement procedures, e.g. through a trustee. As mentioned before, it is unclear 
which of the two regimes provides stronger incentives to bring suit. It is obvious, however, that 
when the trustee initiates litigation – backed by at least 25% of bondholders - the effect on 
borrower behaviour is likely to me much larger than with individual action. In sum, for the 
purpose discussed here, individual enforcement rights may be useful, but whether they are indeed 
necessary or superior to collective rights remains questionable.  
Getting the money 
When creditor representatives argue for stronger individual enforcement rights, they naturally 
appeal to some noble cause, such as the viability of the sovereign debt market or the necessity to 
protect financial flows to emerging market economies. At the heart of statements like the one by 
Michael Chamberlin quoted in the introduction, however, appears to lie but the simple desire to 
enforce the contract, i.e. to get the money that has been promised. As legitimate as this desire 
may be, the objective here is to discuss whether it is in the common interest of creditors to be able 
to pursue this motive. I will in turn examine the individual and the collective perspective.  
Individual perspective 
If an individual bondholder considers only the costs and benefits that accrue to herself, then the 
option to litigate at her own initiative can at worst have a value of zero. In fact, zero may just be 
what it is to the vast majority of bondholders. In all of the major cases against defaulting 
sovereigns, the claimants were fairly large companies, institutional investors, specialised vulture 
funds, or all three.15 The average return they received on the litigation is unknown. Elliott 
Associates has a track record of achieving full repayment in almost every case, but certainly not 
all legal action is as successful. If litigation is not always profitable for large, specialised 
creditors, the expected net present value of suing is much less likely to be positive for small retail 
investors. As exemplified in the Elliott/Peru case outlined in the next section, successful 
completion of a lawsuit may require innovative strategies, legal action in several jurisdictions, 
and most of all deep pockets.  
The Argentine default of 2002 was the first to have provoked a number of retail investors 
going to court. However, as of 2006, none of the judgements that creditors were awarded had 
enabled them to satisfy their claims. It is particularly because of the difficulty to attach the 
debtor’s assets that “agreeing to a reasonable restructuring offer - one that reflects the country’s 
capacity to pay - may be the best option available to mainstream creditors…”16 Getting the money 
(i.e. full repayment) is a hope that only very few bondholders may entertain realistically.  
Collective perspective 
When the welfare of bondholders as a group is considered, the paradoxical possibility arises that 
individual enforcement rights, which are again just an option whose value by definition cannot be 
negative, can actually make the group worse off. The solution to the paradox lies in externalities, 
i.e. the case in which the actions of one bondholder negatively affect the others’ welfare. These 
collective action problems have been discussed in depth elsewhere.17  
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Still, a numerical example may be helpful to illustrate the concept of collective action problems. 
Assume a country owes ten creditors ten units of debt each. The country has a capacity to repay 
only 30 units. Enforcement costs are 40 for a trustee or four units for each individual creditor. 
The trustee would not sue for full repayment but rather accept the 30 units that the country can 
offer in a restructuring. If, however, individual enforcement were possible, a race to the 
courthouse would result in full repayment for the first three creditors and a compete write-off for 
the other seven creditors. The latter result is not only grossly unfair but also inefficient from the 
collective perspective of bondholders. Collective enforcement – or rather restraint from 
enforcement – yields a total payoff of 30 units, as compared to only 18 units with individual 
enforcement rights.18 
In more practical terms, suppose a country was forced to default on its bonds and is now 
trying to obtain additional funding from financial markets to roll over its existing debt or at least 
to be able to offer an attractive restructuring proposal. If the right to initiate legal action rested 
with a trustee, it is unlikely that the trustee would be instructed to litigate because no sufficiently 
large group of bondholders can hope to be repaid in full, given the debtor’s current situation.  
By contrast, an individual creditor may well hope to satisfy her claims by trying to attach 
any fresh money that the country can obtain. With her lawsuit pending, however, the markets will 
be very reluctant to extend new loans to the country. In this situation the majority of bondholders 
will want to restrain individual members of the group from making use of their rights.19 Given a 
choice, they may prefer collective over individual enforcement rights. In the words of 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a, p. 19), collective action problems do “not necessarily 
imply that creditors will be worse off relative to a situation in which they had less rights, but 
[they open] the door for institutional mechanisms [such as] contracts that force creditors to act 
collectively.”  
So much for theory; the next two sections offer some evidence as to how bond markets 
view the exertion of individual enforcement rights in practice.  
4 - The Case 
The settlement of the case Elliott Associates v. Peru in September 2000 provides an ideal testing 
ground to study the market’s reaction to an event that arguably shaped views about individual 
enforcement rights. Such a case study is by no means the only possible approach to assessing the 
value of the enforcement option. Alternative ways include the evidence summarised in Häseler 
(2007): Since one of the main differences between bonds with and without collective action 
clauses lies in the extent of individual enforcement rights, a test of the yield difference between 
the two types of bonds can also be interpreted as a test of enforcement. It has been demonstrated 
that no systematic yield difference exists. The presence of collective action clauses is of course 
only an imperfect proxy for enforcement rights because the two types of bonds also differ in a 
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number of other respects. The present case study presents an alternative, perhaps more direct 
approach to getting a quantitative handle on the meaning of individual bond enforcement.  
The significance of the Elliott case is easily demonstrated. Anne Krueger, First Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, used the case in one of her first speeches about the Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism to demonstrate the shortcomings of the international financial 
architecture. Her counterpart at the time, Michael Chamberlin (2002b, p. 3), refers to the case as 
“the most widely cited (and possibly only) example of roguish behaviour.” The paper by 
Sandoval (2002) begins, “One of the most important cases of the last decade, in the sovereign 
debt arena, was that involving the New York-based hedge fund named Elliott Associates, LP… 
against the Republic of Peru…” 
Course of events20 
In October 1995, the Republic of Peru announced its intention to restructure defaulted 
commercial but officially guaranteed bank loans into Brady bonds. Three months later and, more 
importantly, only two weeks after the successful litigation by Pravin Bankers against Peru, Elliott 
Associates began purchasing a total of $20.7 million in face value of the debt at just over 50 cents 
on the dollar. As the Brady exchange progressed, Elliott predictably refused to participate and 
instead on October 8th, 1996, filed suit against Peru and its instrumentality, Banco de la Nacion, 
hoping to attach the collateral to be used in the exchange. However, the motion for attachment 
was denied.  
The Brady exchange closed on March 7th, 1997, backed by Peru’s verbal promise that no 
preferential treatment would be given to holdouts. In August 1998, the New York Southern 
District Court ruled in response to renewed litigation from Elliot that the claims in question had 
been acquired with the intention of bringing suit, thus violating § 489 of the New York Judiciary 
Law. This was the first time the “champerty” defence had worked for a sovereign debtor. Yet, on 
appeal Elliott succeeded in having the first judgement reversed. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit decided that the fund’s “primary goal was ‘to satisfy the debt’ and not necessarily 
to litigate”.21 The decision came with an attachment and restraining order over any commercial 
property held by the defendants in New York. However, this was of little value to Elliott as 
virtually no such property could be located within the jurisdiction.  
One June 22nd, 2000, the Southern District Court authorised Elliott to recover a sum of 
more than $55 million. While immediate attachment was impractical, the award nevertheless 
posed formidable problems to Peru, which was now forced to rearrange all of its financial flows 
to avoid interference by Elliott in New York. The situation was further aggravated by Elliott’s 
successful attempts to obtain attachment orders in other financial centres.  
A major opportunity for Elliott arose as Peru’s Brady coupon payment date on September 
7th approached. The vulture sought and received restraining orders directed against Chase 
Manhattan Bank acting as Peru’s fiscal agent, as well as against three clearing houses through 
which Peru was going to make the payments. The sovereign was thus forced to find other routes 
to service its debt and in fact missed the payment date, thereby marking the start of a 30-day 
grace period. Consequently, the Peruvian government had to find a way to make the interest 
payment before October 7th. Failing to meet this deadline would have implied a formal incident of 
default, triggering cross-default clauses which would have given Peru’s bondholders the right to 
accelerate almost $4 billion of outstanding debt. Peru’s investigations into the possibility of 
arranging the payments through the Bank of International Settlements yielded no solution to its 
pressing problems.  
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The pace of events increased towards the end of September. On 21st and 22nd, two New York 
courts granted Elliott further restraining orders. On the latter day, Elliott also sought an injunction 
from the Commercial Court of Brussels to prevent the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company as 
operator of the Euroclear settlement system from accepting funds from Peru to be distributed to 
the Brady bondholders. The motion was rejected, Elliott appealed, and on September 26th, the 8th 
Chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeals finally granted Elliott’s request. Facing the imminent 
danger of outright default, Peru settled on September 29th for $58.45 million. All restraining 
orders were lifted and the interest payments were eventually made on October 5th, two days 
before the deadline.  
Reactions 
The settlement of the case appears to have stirred sentiments of unprecedented intensity, which 
naturally varied in flavour across different groups of commentators. It provoked an outcry from 
Jubilee 2000, an international organisation promoting relief for highly indebted countries: “These 
people are trading in human misery. Elliott Associates, L.P., are picking over the bones of the 
Peruvian economy like a pack of vultures.”22 According to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a, 
p. 27), the “Elliott/Peru case led to much consternation in policy circles”. The British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown later said, “We particularly condemn the perversity where vulture funds 
purchase debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the 
full amount owed – a morally outrageous outcome.”23 Anne Krueger also articulated her 
displeasure with the outcome, but with a different perspective in mind. She “denounced the fund, 
alleging that it has undermined the entire structure of sovereign finance.”24 
This paper is, however, more concerned with the impact the case had specifically on the 
position of bondholders and the implications for the value of individual enforcement rights. There 
seems to be a consensus that, at least in the direct aftermath of the settlement, the chances of 
holdouts were perceived to have increased. To quote again Anne Krueger, “The more recent 
success of an aggressive legal strategy employed against Peru by a vulture company called Elliott 
Associates underlines the power that holdout creditors retain.“25 Sandoval (2002, pp. 5) writes, “it 
has been suggested that [the Brussels decision] will definitely strengthen the position of holdout 
creditors… Commentators have suggested that such a decision is one of the most important 
weapons given to holdout creditors to defend against sovereigns…” According to Bradley et al 
(2008, p. 4, FN), “[t]here is a good deal of evidence of market participants characterizing Elliott 
Associates as both unexpected and seismic.” Elliott has also been described as the “high water 
mark for creditor’s rights”.26 
An article in the Bradynet forum27 comments on the settlement from an investor’s perspec-
tive. It regards Elliott’s victory as an event that “gave power back to creditors” after “creditors 
have been beaten up recently”. Furthermore, the “Elliott case is now seen giving investors more 
faith in the legal system” and, “it’s a situation where the legal rights of creditors were 
reaffirmed”. Yet, even this investor-oriented source recognises the ambiguity in the meaning of 
the case: “While some investors see the Elliott case as spearheading creditor rights, others see it 
giving vulture funds more ammunition for legal attacks.” 
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It appears that the academic literature has identified two ways in which the course and outcome of 
the Elliott case could improve the standing of individual creditors wishing to enforce their claims. 
One such aspect of the case concerns the fact that the plaintiff soon abandoned the traditional 
strategy of attempting to attach the debtor’s assets and instead adopted an alternative, arguably 
novel approach. In the words of Zettelmeyer and Sturzenegger (2006a, pp. 27), the case  
appeared to open a powerful new channel for the enforcement of the claims of 
holdouts who had successfully obtained a judgement. Rather than engaging in the 
difficult and tedious process of attempting to attach debtor assets abroad, holdouts 
could ask courts to interfere with cross-border payments to mainstream creditors that 
had previously agreed to a debt restructuring. This seemed to be an almost foolproof 
enforcement channel, since it effectively gave holdouts a veto over the regularization 
of a country’s relations with mainstream creditors, and hence over its return to 
international capital markets. Hence, Elliott/Peru appeared to catapult holdouts from 
their previous status of either a minor nuisance (at worst) or champions of creditor 
rights (at best) to a formidable obstacle to orderly sovereign debt restructurings.  
Secondly, Elliott Associates was able to obtain the final and decisive judgement from the 
Brussels Court of Appeals based on a most unusual argument. The argument was built on the pari 
passu clauses, which is routinely included in international unsecured credit contracts but had 
never before played a role in sovereign debt litigation. The covenant had traditionally been 
interpreted to mean that the debtor may not subsequently issue debt that is senior to the 
instrument that contains the clauses. Elliott, by contrast, presented the interpretation that the 
clause required Peru to make payments to all its foreign creditors on a ratable basis. In other 
words, the plaintiff claimed that Peru was violating the debt contract by trying to make interest 
payments to the Brady bondholders without satisfying Elliott’s demand at least proportionally. 
Commentators have expressed surprise not only about the new “ratable payments” interpretation 
of the pari passu clause (Buchheit and Pam, 2003), but also at the Brussels court’s willingness to 
accept the argument.28 Bradley et al’s (2008, p. 5) interpretation of the case is a combination of 
the two meanings discussed here: “Elliott gave the pari passu clause legal significance by 
empowering creditors to invoke the clause as a means for holding up the sovereign’s restructuring 
of its debt. This was a bargaining chip that heretofore was not possessed by the holders of 
sovereign debt.” 
While it seems that in the immediate aftermath the Elliott/Peru settlement was indeed seen 
by many commentators as potentially strong precedent for future creditor suits, Zettelmeyer and 
Sturzenegger (2006a) explain why over the longer run it became clear that the influence of the 
case was not so large after all. First, the Elliott decision rested heavily on the peculiar 
interpretation of the pari passu clause. Most subsequent litigants failed to obtain a similar ruling 
in comparable cases. Second, possibilities exist for debtor countries to safeguard their payment 
flows by redirecting them outside the reach of holdouts. Third, the legal environment began to 
change in response to Elliott. Belgium soon afterwards adopted laws to prevent the use of the 
Euroclear system for strategies such as Elliott’s.  
In summary, this review of scholarly and public reactions to the Elliott case has shown that 
the vulture’s success has been widely seen to underpin individual enforcement rights and thereby 
to improve the position of holdout creditors, at least in the short run. Whether the events gave 
mainstream bondholders reason to celebrate is, however, an open question. Thus the conclusion is 
similar to the one that was suggested in the review of the relevant theoretical considerations. 
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Testable hypotheses 
Section 3 elaborated on a number of reasons why bondholders might or might not benefit from 
more extensive individual enforcement rights. We have seen that the balance of arguments is 
more likely to be positive for potential holdouts than for mainstream creditors. The Elliott/Peru 
case discussed in this section is an excellent opportunity to test the market reaction to what was 
probably one of the most important events to strengthen the position of individual creditors in the 
recent history of sovereign bond enforcement. Of course market behaviour is always a mixed 
result of the actions of different groups of participants, so unfortunately it is not possible to 
distinguish empirically between the response of mainstream bondholders and vultures.  
The next section nevertheless presents an approach to quantifying the impact of the case, 
not just for Peru itself but also for the sovereign bond indices of a number of other countries. For 
if indeed the events in court bore significance for creditor rights in general, then the effects 
should be felt in any country that has only the slightest probability of default.  
Given the ambiguity of the theoretical arguments and of the opinions on individual 
enforcement rights and the Elliott/Peru case that this paper has presented, there can be no clear 
prior expectation about the sign of the effect that the settlement had on bond prices. For a country 
that is not directly affected by the events, ex ante considerations (the possibility that the 
government will be deterred from defaulting) are probably more important in determining bond 
prices than ex post considerations, such as the possibility that the Elliott/Peru outcome could 
increase the danger of harmful litigation in the future. Thus, if anything, one might expect the 
effect on countries that are not directly affected to tend more towards the positive than the effect 
on the Peruvian bonds.  
Speaking about possible results it should be mentioned that several different outcomes are 
observationally equivalent. A lack of effect of the settlement on bond prices could have at least 
four meanings:  
• Either enforcement rights simply are not a major concern to bondholders,  
• or perhaps bondholders do feel strongly about them but are unsure whether individual or 
collective enforcement rights are to be preferred, 
• or perhaps the lack of price movements is the result of offsetting effects from two groups of 
bondholders - those who welcome Elliott’s victory (vultures?) and those who think of it 
more as a threat (mainstream creditors?), 
• or the settlement was not seen as making a difference for the future of bond enforcement, 
but this would be grossly inconsistent with the opinions cited above and throughout the 
literature.  
Before launching into the empirical analysis, it has to be mentioned that the discussion of the 
Peruvian case is somewhat complicated by a historical coincidence. It just so happens that the 
events in court discussed here were immediately preceded by the “most serious political crisis in 
a decade”29 in Peru. On September 14th, 2000, a video was broadcast on Peruvian national 
television that showed Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the national intelligence service and right-
hand man of President Alberto Fujimori, handing over a bribe of $15,000 to an opposition 
congressman for his defection to Fujimori’s party. The resulting public outrage forced Fujimori to 
announce on September 16th elections for the next year in which he would not stand again for 
President. Shortly afterwards, Fujimori fled the country and was impeached by Congress. The 
political crisis can quite clearly be expected to depress bond values. “The increased political 
uncertainty will depress investment, raise financing costs, and slow the economy”, commented 
the deputy head of the sovereign ratings group at Standard & Poor’s.30 Furthermore, a change of 
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government is always associated with the risk that the new administration will use the opportunity 
to repudiate old debts.  
Whether from the perspective of the analysis this coincidence of the two sets of events is a 
curse or a blessing is hard to say. On the one hand, the effects of the political events may be 
assumed to have lasted for a number of weeks and thus to have overshadowed the events in court. 
An attempt will be made to model the prolonged repercussions of the political crisis in the 
regressions. On the other hand, the political events can be used as a point of reference to gauge 
the strength of the impact of the events in court.  
5 - The Evidence 
Methodology 
The basic methodology is a time-series study of sovereign bond index returns for Peru and other 
countries, with special attention given to the effects of the settlement episode. Daily bond index 
data for the years 1999 to 2001 are divided into 93 periods of eight trading days each. The 
rationale for this perhaps slightly unusual breakdown of the sample lies in the nature of the event 
under scrutiny. The most important developments in the Elliott/Peru case span a period of seven 
trading days, from the first of the final two court judgements for Elliott in New York on 
September 21st to the settlement on September 29th. Since it is not clear whether the market was 
able to fully evaluate all information about the settlement on that day, the event window also 
encompasses the next trading day. Within those eight days, investors witnessed a milestone legal 
victory by an individual creditor and presumably drew their conclusions about the meaning of this 
event for enforcement rights and the attractiveness of Peruvian and other government bonds. The 
enforcement event is assigned the dummy variable D_EA (for Elliott Associates), which takes the 
value one for t=55 and zero in all other periods. The coefficient on the dummy variable thus tells 
us by how much bond returns differed during that particular period from what they would have 
otherwise been, keeping constant all other variables that are included in the regression.  
Peru 
The revelation of the bribery scandal and subsequent announcement of new elections fall into the 
period immediately before the court event. I construct a variable for the political event, D_POL, 
to capture any abnormal returns that can be attributed to the scandal. In the simplest formulation 
(D_POL_1) it equals one for t=54 and zero in all other periods. However, it is likely that the 
political turmoil depressed bond returns for some time after September 16th. After all, Alberto 
Fujimori had managed to remain in power in seemingly hopeless situations before. The political 
crisis in Peru only started to be resolved in November 2000. Moser (2007) finds that political 
instability tends to depress bond prices for as long as 40 days after the event. Accordingly, 
D_POL_2 models the impact of the event as lasting for five periods (see figure 2 below).  
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 t=53 t=54 t=55 t=56 t=57 t=58 t=59 
D_POL_1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
D_POL_2 0 1 0,5 0,333 0,25 0,2 0 
D_POL_PRESS 39 149 263 64 0 0 0 
 
Figure 2: Different ways of modelling the political event 
 
Both D_POL_1 and D_POL_2 are simplistic and, which is more concerning, arbitrary ways of 
modelling the course and effect of the political crisis. D_POL_PRESS takes a different 
approach.31 This variable counts the number of US press releases on LexisNexis Business that 
contain the search term “Fujimori” in each period. Figure 3 graphs the number of articles as 
















































































































Number of press releases per day (left scale) / per period (right scale)
 
Figure 3: Number of articles per day in the US press that mention “Fujimori”, from LexisNexis 
 
The political crisis is clearly represented by the bulk of articles in the second half of September. 
D_POL_PRESS reverts back to zero after t=56 because the resurgence of press releases towards 
the end of October was already due to the next, separate set of events.32 This is of course again an 
arbitrary decision, but to proxy the impact of the political crisis through the attention it received 
in the media is surely an improvement over the purely theoretical formulations of D_POL_1 and 
D_POL_2.33  
                                                   
 
31
 I am most grateful to Jonathan Klick for this suggestion. 
32
 From October 23rd onwards, the news of Vladimiro Montesinos returning to Peru and Vice President 
Francisco Tudela resigning in consequence received a lot of media coverage. 
33
 Only two of the articles in t=55 mention Elliott Associates. This means that D_POL_PRESS is able to 
make a clear distinction between the events in court and in parliament.  
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As dependent variable, in accordance with Moser (2007), I use JP Morgan’s Emerging Market 
Bond Index Global (EMBIG). The data were obtained from Thomson’s Datastream service. To 
be more precise, the dependent variable consists in the percentage change in the index value over 
the eight-trading-day periods. Figure 4 plots absolute EMBIG values for Peru during the relevant 
weeks. It is evident that the political events (marked 2 and 3) had a large negative impact on the 





























































































































No. Date Event 
1 07.09.2000 missed Brady interest payment 
2 14.09.2000 corruption scandal becomes public 
3 15.09.2000 new elections announced (16th) 
4 19.09.2000 S&P rating downgrade 
5 21.09.2000 NY court decision for Elliott 
6 22.09.2000 NY court decision for Elliott and motion filed in Brussels -> denied 
7 26.09.2000 appeal in Brussels granted 
8 29.09.2000 settlement 
9 05.10.2000 Brady interest payment made 
 
Figure 4: EBMIG index values and some important dates 
 
Besides the dummies34 for the political and enforcement event, a number of other explanatory 
variables were considered. 
                                                   
 
34
 D_POL_2 and D_POL_3 are admittedly not dummy variables in the usual sense. 
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The percentage change in the JP Morgan EMBIG index for Asia (JPMGASI, also obtained from 
Datastream) is used to proxy for all sorts of factors that influence sovereign bond markets 
globally. The expected coefficient sign of this proxy is positive. In accordance with Moser 
(2007), another explanatory variable consists in the percentage change in the 10-year US 
Treasury Bill rate (UST), as obtained from Yahoo Finance. Finally, I use the percentage change 
in the Peruvian exchange rate (NUEVO_SOL). Theses data are taken from www.oanda.com. The 
expected sign is negative for the following reasoning: An improvement in a country’s capacity to 
service its debt should, besides raising the price of its debt, boost the value of its currency and 
thus reduce the exchange rate as measured in local currency units per dollar. 
Estimation and results 
All estimations were done using straightforward OLS regression in EVIEWS. First a 
parsimonious equation for Peru was estimated without the dummies. The results are presented as 
model 1 in figure 5. The model has a good overall fit and passes the usual tests for violations of 
the classical assumptions. The US Treasury Bill rate proved to be largely uncorrelated with 
Peruvian government bond prices, so the variable was dropped, even though it was attributed 
great explanatory power in the study by Moser (2007). By contrast, the coefficients on JPMGASI 
and NUEVO_SOL are highly significant and of the expected sign. The latter result is somewhat 
unexpected as the Peruvian exchange rate was effectively a managed float at the time so that 
changing economic fundamentals could drive the value of the currency only to a degree.  
 
Dependent variable: JPMGPER t-statistics 
Variable model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
C -0.238 0.17 0.37 0.303 
JPMGASI 5.753 5.696 5.551 5.478 
NUEVO_SOL -4.913 -4.886 -4.919 -4.917 
D_EA - -0.865 0.448 1.752 
D_POL_1 - -3.045 - - 
D_POL_2 - - -2.956 - 
D_POL_PRESS - - - -2.584 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4477 0.4926 0.4898 0.4787 
 
Figure 5: Various specifications to predict JPMGPER 
 
The introduction of D_POL and D_EA in models 2 to 4 makes little difference to the coefficients 
of the control variables. The political event appears to have had a strong negative impact on bond 
returns, not just in the period in which it occurred, but also when the effect is modelled as 
diminishing only gradually over time, as in the last two columns. 
The sign change of D_EA between model 2 and models 3 and 4 is quite informative. It is 
exactly the outcome one would expect if the political event had a prolonged effect and the 
enforcement event had none. In model 2, D_POL_1 most likely captures the politically-motivated 
depression of returns in t=54, and D_EA mostly captures the continuing negative effect of the 
political event in t=55, rather than any effects of the settlement. When D_POL is modified in 
model 3 to allow for an extended impact of the scandal, D_EA is “relieved” of the burden 
wrongly attributed to it in model 1 and promptly changes sign. Model 4, which arguably 
represents the best way of incorporating the political event, returns a t-value for D_EA that is 
relatively large but still not significant. Yet a different specification of D_POL could easily cause 
the coefficient of D_EA to be zero. This would not be the case if investors had taken the 
Elliott/Peru case to have either a positive or negative general meaning for the position of 
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creditors. Restricting the sample to 53 observations as a robustness check yields very similar 
estimates for the event dummies.  
Other countries 
To test whether the Elliott settlement influenced bond prices of countries that were not directly 
affected, I ran a series of regressions of the form 
 
  EMBIGi,t = c + αi*USTt + βi*D_EA + εi 
 
for 19 countries of moderate and poor credit ratings.35 The coefficient estimate on the event 
dummy measures the abnormal return in each country’s bond index during the settlement period. 
The t-values of that coefficient range between -0.43 and 1.49, so none of the countries 
experienced significant abnormal returns. The average of 0.31 is again not significantly different 
from zero.  
Given the lack of effect for Peru and the ambiguity as to the merits of individual 
enforcement rights, this result was to be expected. A possibility, however, is that even though the 
settlement event had no effect on third countries on average, the impact on individual countries 



























Figure 6: Sovereign credit ratings and abnormal returns during the settlement period 
 
Standard and Poor’s foreign currency credit ratings were transformed into numerical values such 
that the lowest default risk in this group of countries (BBB+) is assigned the value 1 whereas the 
highest default risk (SD) is assigned the value 10. The abnormal returns (scaled by their standard 
deviations to obtain t-values) bear no correlation to default risk, neither their absolute values nor 
                                                   
 
35
 This is the universe of countries for which data on the Emerging Market Bond Index Global is available 
from Datastream for the period 1999-2001.  
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their variance. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that investors around the world took much 
notice of the Elliott case, or at least they did not appear to have a clear view of whether the 
outcome improved or harmed their position.  
6 – Conclusion 
This paper has presented a critical view of individual enforcement rights in international 
sovereign bonds as seen from the perspective of overall bondholder welfare. It has been demon-
strated that, whichever may be the primary motivation for some bondholders to insist on 
individual enforcement rights, the aims could be equally well achieved if the powers to enforce 
the claims rested with a trustee. Where collective action problems play a crucial role, the ability 
to initiate legal action individually can be detrimental to the common interest of creditors.  
The analysis of market reaction to the Elliott/Peru settlement fits in well with the 
theoretical considerations. Compared to the effects of the political turmoil, the market seems to 
have taken hardly any notice of what has been described as the greatest boost to creditor rights in 
the decade. Given the observational equivalence of different results, though, this lack of abnormal 
returns has to be interpreted carefully. What can be said under the assumption that the outcome of 
the case was indeed perceived as a triumph for individual enforcement is that there must be a 
large fraction of investors who are at best sceptical of the merits of individual enforcement rights.  
Remarkably, that fraction has never raised its voice, for example in the debates about 
collective action clauses. Arguments in favour of collective enforcement have come forward from 
academics and public sector representatives, but not from bondholders themselves, even though 
the present analysis suggests that there must be supporters of trust structures among the ranks of 
creditors. Public choice theory may help to explain this puzzle. The negative externalities caused 
by individual litigation are borne by a large group of bondholders and are therefore not material 
to any of them. The benefits, by contrast, accrue almost exclusively to the plaintiff. The ‘usual 
suspects’ for maverick litigation are probably a relatively small number of vulture funds, who 
have a strong incentive to lobby for the preservation or expansion of individual enforcement 
rights. The potential opposition, however, is widely dispersed, anonymous, and therefore less 
well organised and less effective in influencing public opinion.  
One should think that organisations such as EMTA would take a balanced stance on 
individual enforcement, one that reflects the diversity of the creditor community. Why then did its 
chairman assert that creditors want unrestricted individual enforcement rights? Part of the answer 
may be found in public choice theory. Part of the answer is also that EMTA’s membership is 
comprised solely of institutional investors, and Elliott Associates is one of them.  
It may be speculated that the opposition to collective action clauses before 2003, which 
was justified by concerns about enforcement rights, was unrepresentative of the views of most 
bondholders. Only potential holdouts and vultures stood to lose from collective action clauses and 
the associated (slight) restriction of individual enforcement rights. If that is so, policymakers need 
not have hesitated to apply pressure on issuers to effectuate the change in market practice.  
Looking ahead, a better understanding of the meaning of enforcement can pave the way for 
the speedy adoption of trust structures outside of England. Other financial centres should follow 
the example of the London Stock Exchange and make the appointment of a trustee a listing 
requirement. Any remaining protest from bondholders probably reflects individual rather than 
collective interests and can therefore be disregarded. Being able to say that bondholders are at 
worst indifferent about relinquishing their remaining individual enforcement rights would also 
open the door for some tentative welfare analysis of individual versus collective rights. Most 
likely, sovereign debtors would prefer to deal with the latter – lower negotiation costs, more 
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predictable outcomes. The public sector, too, has made its preference for trust structures quite 
clear. Again, authorities should press for what promises to be a Pareto improving reform.  
Further research should continue to refine our understanding of bondholders’ attitudes 
towards individual enforcement rights. A simple survey of investors’ opinions could be quite 
informative. Alternatively, one could test for yield differences between bonds governed by fiscal 
agency agreements versus trust deeds.  
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